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1.  INTRODUCTION
Where is the world economy  heading in the decade  of the 1990s?  Although, the ongoing process
of global economic  integration  is likely to continue  unabated, in view of a large number of important
economic  and political changcs  tthat  are taking place worldwide, it is not clear how various regions or
countries  will fare in the global economy  by the end of this century. Will Japan and Western Europe
overtake North America in terms of living standa.d, or economic  and financial clout? How would the
economic  and political transformations  in Eastern Europe, or the massive  changes  in the Soviet Union,
affect international  trade and financial  flows?  And, how will the developing  countries be affected  by
these  global developments?  Will these countries,  a large majority  of which experienced  low or no growth
during the 1980s,  be able  to resume growth and development  in the 1990s? These are difficult  questions
to answer, particularly at the present  juncture. This is partly because  there is a great deal of uncertainty
concerning  the evolution of international  trade and financial flows in the 1990s, and partly due to the
possibility  that the traditional real and financial  linkages  between regions or countries may themselves
be changing. Moreover, as far as the outlook for developing countries is concerned, an additional
(perhaps  the most important)  source  of uncertainty  is their own domestic  policies. The main question  is
to what extent will the developing  countries  as a group be successful  in implementing  the needed  policy
reforms and structural changes  during the 1990s?
Looking ahead, over the next several years, there are both positive and negative  aspects to the
major changes  that are currently  taking  place in the world economy.  On the positive  side, there is a wide-
spread economic  and political reform on several fronts:  a serious attempt to liberalize world trade in
goods and services, a major program for market unification  and monetary union in western Europe,
detente among the super-powers  that could slow the arms race, economic transformation  of Ezstern
Europe and its integration  in the international  economy, and the rapid pace of technological  progress.
These  events,  together hold a lot of promise  and opportunities  for growth  and prosperity  in the 1990s  and
beyond. But, there are also a number  of short-  and medium-term  imponderables.  The substantial  volatility
in oil prices in 1990-91  demonstrated  how vulnerable  the world economy in general, and developing
countries  in particular, are to major  adverse  shocks.  There is considerable  financial  volatility  in the world
economy, as portfolios  of some of the biggest  banks and insurance  companies  in the United States  and
Japan have been weakened  by a large number  of defaults  in the non-financial  sector and, the 1990  plunge
and current volatility  of equity prices. There are fears of an impending  shortage  of international  capital
that could drive up international  real interest rates.  A number of major industrial countries were in-2-
recession  early this year, and their recovery could  be slow and wzak. Because  of a large divergenme  in
the present  negotiating  position  of the United  States  and the European  Community,  particularly  in the area
of agriculture,  the Uruguay  Round of negotiations  for liberalizing  world trade could  fail. There are signs
that if these negotiations  collapse, the risk becomes  far greater that existing regional trading blocs will
turn protectionist.
Obviously,  trying to quantify  the economic  effects  that may be emanating  from occurrence  of any
of these events, either positive or  negative, on the long-term growth prospects of  industrial and
developing  countries  is both difficult  and highly speculative. This is mainly because neither the timing
nor the exact transmission  mechanism  of any of these events are known with much certainty.  And,
perhaps more importantly,  some of the traditional  real and financial  linkages  betv een  the developing  and
industrial countries may have been changed starting in  the  1980sY'  These issues notwithstanding,
attempts  have been made to quantify  various scenarios  for international  economic  environment,  and its
effect on growth and development  in the 1990s,  in the recent issues  of World Bank's annual publications
such as the World Development  Report, and Global Economic  Prospects paper as well as the IMF's
World Economic  Outlook and other reports-'.
The main purpose of this brief note is to try to verify and in some cases critically assess the
quantitative  results  of a selected  scenarios  for the 1990s  that are of importance  to the developing  countries
using alternative  models. The scenarios  considered  below in this paper are:
- financial  stress in Japan and the United  States;
- the U.S. budget  deficit and its effect on world savings and interest rates;
- .atility  of oil prices;
- p,rotectionism  and regional  trade blocs; and
- high and low productivity  growth scenarios  for the world economy.
The molels used for this purpose are the Bank's GEM/CFM model, and the IMF's MULTIMOD
model. In some instances,  published  simulation  of results from the OECD's INTERLINK  model as well
1'  See, for example, Louis Emmerij  (ed.), One World or Several?,  OECD, Paris, 1989.
2/  For example, see World Bank, World Development  Report 1991. forthcoming;  World Bank, International
Economics  Department,  'Global  Economic  Prospects  and theDeveloping  Countries,  1991', International  Economics
Department,  World Bank, 1991;  IMF, World  Economic  Outlook,  October 1990,  and April 1991  issues, Washington
D.C.; Fardoust  and Dhareshwar, A Lone-term Outlook  for the World Economy Policy and Research Series 12,
World  Bank, 1990,  Washington,  D.C.-3-
as some of the private forecasting  firms are reported for comparison3'. In section 2, we discuss some
of the key quantitative  issues  concerning  real and financial  linkages  between  the industrial  and developing
economies. In section 3, some of the major issues in the 1990s are discussed; and in section 4, the
simulation results using alternative models are presented. The last section presents a summary and
conclusion  of the main findings.
1'  Some  of these  models  are described  briefly  in Annex  2.-4-
2.  REAL AND FINANCIAL,  LINKAGES
The traditional  linkages  between  industrial  and deveioping  countries  operate via three main channels: (a)
bilateral trade  volume (commodities, oil,  and  manufactures), (b)  international trade  price  links
(commodities,  oil, and manufactures);  and (c) financial links (financial  resource flows, international
interest  rates and exchange  rates among  the key currencies). It is mainily  through these channels  that the
industrial countries' economic  growth as well as their trade and financial policies affect the growth
performance  of developing  countries.  There is also a reverse causality. That is, growth in developing
countries  may affect growth in industrial  countries.  On the aggregate  level, this linkage  operates mainly
through the level of import  demand and prices of commodities  (mainly  oil) in the developing  countries.
Despite  growing  trade and financial  linkages  over the last  25 years, the impact  of the developing  country
growth  on industrial country  growth (i.e., the reverse causality)  has remained  relatively  weak. The two
most imoortant  examples  of the reverse causality  in recent years are: the sharp rise in import  demand  in
the oil-exporting  developing  countries  in 1974-76  after the first oil price shock, which helped  reduce the
negative  impact of the supply shock in the industrial countri-s, particularly W'estern  Europe; and the
impact  of the sharp decline in imports  of the severely indebted cou.,(ries  in 1982  which worsened  the
recession  in the industrial countries,  particularly  the United States.
As shown in Table 1, the magnitude  of the impact  of the economic  slowdown in the industrial
countries  on the developing  countries' growth has changed  over the years. The impact  of the 1973-75
recession  was significantly  srmlaller  than the one in 1969-71  mainly because  of the sharp rise in lending
to developing  countries  in the 1970s,  which was facilitated  by the recycling  of oil exporting countries'
current account  surplus.  However,  because  of the debt overhang  of the developing  countries  and high real
interest rates in the industrial  countries, the impact  of the industrial  countries' recession  on developing
countries' growth increased in 1979-82  and 1988-91.  One major change that may have taken place in
recent years is the tendency of real international  interest  rates to rise (instead  of falling) during periods
of slowdown  in industrial  countries.
The following  regression  estimates  the impact  on the GDP growth rate of developing  countries  of
the GDP growth of the industrial countries  and international  interest rates for the period 1965-88:
(1)  gyidc = 3.192 + C.294gyOECD  + 0.399gyOECD(-1)  - 0.182Rwrate  - 0.107Dummy;  R2 =  0.44
(4.3)  (1.7)  (2.5)  (1.8)  (0.1)-5-
Table  1.  Cyclical changes  in Seledcted  Indicators
(percentage points)
II  1-  1  -'-'1-
Change  in GDP  Change  in  Change  in
Recession  growth rate of  GDP groAlh  real  Change in
(from pgk  to  industrie  ratelof  intre  terefral  C-5  Ratio  1)io  Ratio
through)  countries  develping  ioterest  interest  (2)/l  -)  (2)/(3)  (2)/(4)
(1)  COLfntries  rate  a/  rate b/
(2)  (3)  (4)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
1969-71: 2 years  -2.4  -2.2  -2.6  n.a  0.91  0.84  n a
1973-75: 2 years  -6.0  -2.1  -4.7  n.a  0.35  0 45  n.a
1979-82: 3 years  -3.5  -2 1  +3.6  +2.4  0.60  1.50  -0.87
1988-91: 3 years cl  -3.0  -1.9  -2.6  +0  8  0.63  0 73  -1.10
aver, ge  -3.7  -2.0  1.6  +1.6  0.56  0  13  -0.98
Source:  OECD) and World Bank data.
a/  Real interest rate in LIBOR (6-month dollar deposits) deflated by U.S. GNP dcflator.
b/  Real interest rate is average (unwcighted) of G-5 real interest rates, wlhich arc defined as LIBOR (6-montli local
currency  deposits) deflated by average G-5 GNP/GDP deflator.
cl  1991 figures are forecasts from IEC, World Bank
where gyldc =  annual rate of GDP growth of low and middle income countries: gyOECD  =  annual rate
of  growth of  GDP  in  industrial countries,  (-1)  =  one  year  lag;  Rwrate  =  world  real  interest rate
(LIBOR; 6-month dollar deposits), Dummy =  dummy variable for oil price shocks of 1974 and 1979-80.
According to equation (1) nearly 44 percent of variation of GDP growth rate of the developing countries
as a group over the period  1965-88 can be explained by changes in the rate of growth of the industrial
countries  and  world  interest  rate.  Although,  the  coefficient of  determination  (R 2)  is  relatively  high
statistically,  most  of the  variation  in  growth  of  developing  countries  remains  unexplained.4  After
controlling for the cyclical effects of the industrial countries' economic performance the estimated trend
(basic) growth rate of developing countries is 3.2 percent a year.
A  one  percentage  point  rise  in  the GDP  growth  rate of  industrial  countries raises  developing
country growth by about 0.7  percentage point after two vears (i.e.  after controlling for  changes in the
4'  For  example,  William  Cline  (in  World  Inflation  and  the  Developing  Couitries.  the  Brookings  ln'titute.
Washington,  D.C.,  1981,  pp.2 42)  using  1960-77  data  estimates  even  a weaker  relationship:
gyldc =  4.67  t  0.230 *  gyOECD(-1): R 2 =  0.21.
(1.9)-6-
real interest rate). The change in industrial country growth (and its lagged effect) tends to capture the
cyclical effects of trade volume and trade pr -e changes  on the developing  countries' growth.  On the
other hand, after controlling  for these effects, a 100 basis point rise in world interest rates reduces
developing  country  growth by about 0.2 percentage  point. Because  of differences in trade structure and
linkages as well as in the extent of external indebtedness,  the estimated impact of these variables on
developing country growth varies significantly  across regions.  The impact of a change in industrial
country  growth is largest in Latin America  and East Asia, while  the impact  of a change  in world interest
rates is largest in EMENA and Latin America. These regression estimates  are presented in Annex 1.
Now we turn to discussing  simulation  results of large-scale  econometric  models. Three types of
multiplier  exercises  are performed  using  the CFM and MULTIMOD  models. These simrllations  measure
the impact  of the following  changes  on developing  countries' growth performance  over a decade:
- 1 percentage  point rise in industrial  country  growth, sustained  over a decade;
- 100 basis point rise in world interest rates, sustained  over a decade;
- a trade and finance policy  package for developir.g  countries (involving  a doubling  of foreign
direct investment  flows, and a combination  of trade-related  supply-side  effects and a more
liberal trading system leading to a 2 percentage  points rise a year in the rate of growth of
exports of developing  countries,  sustained  over a decade).
The results of these simulations  are presented in Table 2.  There is a striking similarity between the
simulation  results of the CFM and those of the simple regression  (naive) model  of equation (1) for both
the effects of a change  in industrial  country  growth and world interest rates.
On the other hand,  the magnitude of  the effects as  implied by  the simulation results of
MULTIMOD  are somewhat  different. The differences  are due to two major properties  of MULTIMOD
which are absent in CFM.  First, because MULTIMOD  has forward-looking  properties the effects of
"multiplier" exercises (table 2) tend to be significantly  different from those with backward-looking
expectation  particularly  for financial  prices. In MULTIMOD  expectations  adjust quickly  to any change
in policy variables. In CFM, on the other hand, expectations  are adaptive, except for debt flows which
can be forward-looking,  and play only a minor  role if any. Second, the construct  of MULTIMOD  allows
interaction  between  the industrial  and developing  country  groups,  so there are some second-round  (reverse
casualty) effects for each of the "multiplier"  exercises presented in table 2.  Even though the reverse-
casuality  effects, from the developing  country  group to the industrial  countries  tend to be smal! over the
longer-term,  in the short-term  and for individual  industrial  countries  they could  be significant.-7-
Table 2.  Impact  of Changes in the Internationai Economic Environnietnt
on Developing  Co  natries' Economic  Performance in the 1990s
OECbI growth  LIBOR up by  Trade and private
up by 1 pet-cent  a/  100 basis points  finance package b/
CFM  MULTIMOD  CFM  MULT'IMOD IFM  MULTIMOD
-----------  avcrag_  percentage  deviations  per year 
Developing  oountriesqc  0.7  0.5 (0.5)*  -0.2  -0.1 (4.6)*  1.3  t  v (0.6)'
Industrial  countricJ  1.0  1.0 (1.3)*  - -0.3 (-1.6)'  ...  0.0 (0.3)*
Exp2rt growt,h
Developing  countries  r/  0.8  1.5 (2.2)*  -0.2  -0.2 (-2.3)*  2.0  2.0
Industrial  countries  ...  1.1 (3.0)*  ...  -0.3 (-2.9)*  ...  0.1 (0.9)*
Interest rate
Short-term  interest rates  ...  -1.1 (-2.1)*  1.0  1.0  ...  -0.4
in industrial  countries
Source: Author's calculations.
*  Figures in parenthesis  show the effect  in the first year of the simulation  period (1991-2000).
LI  It should  be noted that in MULTIMOD  raising  the long .nrm  growth of the industrial  countries  (for the purpose  of
generating  the 'multiplier" results for table 2) requires changing  some of the policy levers in the model (i.e., taxes,
money supplies, etc.).  Thus, raising  the industrial  country  group's growth by about 1 percentagc.  point was brought
about by raising the money supply. Thus, the growth 'multiplier" results generated  by MULTIMOD  should  be
interpreted  differently  from those by CFM, which takes  the rate of growth of industrial  countries  exogenously  (see
Annex 2).
k/ Higher  world trade growth and higher level of FDI to the developing  countries.
g/  In MULTIMOD,  the developing  country  group is "net debtor  countries' which is similar  in its country  classification
to the developing  countries  in CFM.
One conclusion  that may be drawn from the results presented  in this section is:  the effect of an
increase  in the rate of growth in the industrial  countries  on the rate of growth of developing  countries as
a group is unambiguously  positive, but the magnitude  of the impact  depends crucially  on the level of real
international  interest  rates, which, in turn, depends  on how the real and financial  sectors and expectations
are modelled. On the one hand, growing  economic  integration  (e.g., as m' asured by the rise in the ratio
of tradable goods and services  to total output)  may have increased  the magnitude  of the spillover  effects
of changes in the industrial countries' growth performance  on the developing  countries.  On the other
hand, the growing  importance  of financial  links may have  altered  the eventual  impact  of growth impulses-8-
emanating  trom the real side. The worst combination  ef external  economic  conditions  for the developing
countries (particularly  those severely indebted)  is a decline in the rate of growth of industrial countries
with rising real international  interest  rates. Rising growth  in the industrial  countries  with a declining  real
international interest rates provides the best combination  of external conditions for growth in the
developing  countries. Starting in the 1980s,  both recessions  and recoveries  in the irdustrial economies
have resulted  in either unchanging  or even  rising real interest rates internationall,, the negative  spill-over
effects  on the developing  countries  (as a group) have  tended to be magnified  while  the positive  spill-over
effects have  tended to be weakened. Nevertheless,  the size of the impact  may differ significantly  from
country to  country as both the  initial conditions and  stance of  domestic polic;es tends to  vary
considerably.-9-
3.  SOME OF THE KEY ECONOMIC ISStJES IN TIIE 1990s
The longer-term  outlook  for both the industrial  countries  and developing  countries in the 1990s  will he
influenced  significantly  by the changes  that may take )lace in international  financial and trade flows  as
well as in international  interest rates and oil prices.  Yet, these are precisely the areas in which there is
now a large degree of uncertainty  -- perhaps more than any time since  the early 1970s. The issues  that
are discussed  briefly in this section  are those that are formulated  into scenarios  and their possible impact
on growth and development  are quantified  in section  4.
Financial Stress in Japan and the United Sta%s:  Since the latter half of the 1980s industrial
c ,untries  have experienced  several episodes  of financial instability  which threatened  economic  growth.
Most notable of these instabilities are the widespread failure of depository financial intermediaries
(savings and loan institutions)  in the United States, the worldwide  stock market declines in 1987 and
1989, and the financial  turbulence  in Japan in 1990. At present (mid-1991).  some of the biggest  banks
and insurance companies  of the United States and Japan have been weakened  significantly  by a large
number of defaults by the non-financial  sectors, high interest rates, and falling share and real estate
prices. The possibility  of "contagion  effects"  presents a serious potential  problem to the world economy
in the 1990s.
The U.S. Fiscal Deficit, World Savings and Interest Rates:  The U.S. current a';count balance
swung from a $7 billion surplus in 1981  to a deticit of $162 billion in 1986. Since then the deficit has
gradually  declined  but still hovers  around $100 billion. It is estimated  that this deficit  has absorbed  about
4 to 5 percent of tota! savings  of the rest of the world per year since the mid-1980s.5' The ballooi-,ing
of the U.S. current account deficit is linked  with the sharp increase  in the U.S. federal budget  deficit.
As a result of a highly expansionary  fiscal policy (lower tax rates and higher spending levels) in
the U.S., the federal budget  deficit climbed  from 2.4 percent of GNP in 1981  to around 5 percent in the
mid-1980s,  before  gradually  declining  to 3 percent in the late 1980s. These large fiscal deficits  have been
associated  with the persistence  of high real interest rates in the international  capital markets. The U.S.
budget deficit is expected  to remain large over the next several years and thus may continue to exert
upward pressure on world interest rates.  If the U.S. budget deficits worsens, it could exacerbate  the
5'  The level of world savings (gross national  savings)  is estimated  to be about $400 billion (around 20 percent
of world GDP).-10-
current fears concerning world capital shortage, which is taking place as the result of greater world
demand  for new capital relative  to the world  supply of savings. Both  private and public savings  in Japan
are declining,  Germany's  current account  surplus  has fallen sharply  as the process  of unification  increases
investment  demand, and the demand for capital is rising in Eastern Europe and (because of post-war
reconstruction)  the Middle East.  These factors will lead to upward pressures on international  interest
rates that will moderate the pace of  investment  in both industrial and developing countries.  This
possibility  poses a serious risk to the growth  prospects  of developing  countries. A significant  decline in
the U.S. budget deficit  could lower world interest rates, and lead to more investment  and faster growth
worldwide.
VolatvItv  of Oil Prices: After a long period  of relative  stability,  oil prices became  highly volatile
in the 1970s. The coefficient  of variation§'  of average monthly  oil prices lose from 0.07 percenit  during
the period of 1970-72,  to 0.74 percent for the period 1973-80. Although, the extent of volatility  of oil
prices has declined  in recent years (the coefficient  of variation  for 1981-90  period was 0.32), there have
been several spikes  such as those in 1987  and 1990. High and volatile  oil prices in the period of 1973-80
led to  economic slow-down, a  sharp rise  in inflation rates, lower productivity growth, and high
unemployment  worldwide. Although, for industrial  countries as a group, oil consumption  relative to
economic  activity fell by 40 percent between 1973  and 1988,  their economies  (and particularly  those of
oil importing developing  countries) remain highly vulnerable  to sharp increases  in oil prices.  Supply
constraints in the industrial countries and the Soviet U.,ion will make the Persian Gulf region the
predominant  supplier of oil by the mid-1990s.  Therefore, oil prices, in the medium-term, will be
influenced  by political and security considerations  in the Middle  East even more than before.  As long
as the political conditions  in that region remain unsettled, oil supplies will remain vulnerable  and there
could be episodes of sharp spikes in oil prices in the 1990s.  On the other hand, close cooperation
between the major oil producing and consuming  countries could go a long way in preventing major
disruptions  of vital oil supplies and thereby disallowing  sharp spikes in oil prices in the 1990s.
Protectionism  and Regional  Trade Blocs: Some  of the recent trade initiatives  have strong regional
dimensions. There is a trend toward more concentration  of trade flows within  three major blocs -- North
America, European community,  and East Asia.  As of the mid-1980s,  trade within the bloc as a share
of total trade was 69 percent in western Europe, 41 percent in North America, -n"d  31 percent in East
6/  Defined  as the ratio of standard deviation  to the mean value.-1 1-
Asia. Do these developments  signal  a possible  breakdown  in the open trading system? The outcome  wvill
crucially depend on whether the Uruguay Round trade negotiations  -- the first to  include developing
countries  as active participants  -- are successful  or not.  If these negotiations  were to collapse, the risk
of a trade war among  the major regional  groups would rise significantly. A rise in protectionism  in the
19"Os  will be very costly to all countries, particularly  the developing  countries. It has been estimated
that the removal of trade restrictions by the industrial  countries  against the developing  countries could
raise the latter's GDP level by 3 to 4 percent. The impact is probably  signitficantly  larger if the longer-
term dynamic effects are also taken int( account.  Therefore, whether the 1990s will be a decade of
substantial  progress in liberalizing  the world trading  system or a period of intensitfied  protectionism  will
be  crucial factor in influencing  investment  and growth in the developing  countries.
Productivity  Growth: productivity  growth is the single  most important  factor contributing  to the
impressive  growth record of today's industrial economies  during the last 100 years.  These countries'
ability  to improve  their standard  of living over this period depended  almost entirely on their impressive
achievement  in raising  their output  per man-hour. 2 Growth  in labor productivity  accounts  for more than
two-thirds of growth in total GDP of the industrial countries in the 20th century.  During this period,
these countries raised their average standard  of living by six-fold.  Therefore, if one assumes that the
main engine  of growth  for today's industrial  countries  has been the relentless  progress in technology  and
advancement  of knowledge,  which are embodied  in machines  and people, then should we be concerned
about prospects for growth and development  over the 1990s? The answer is yes for several reasons.
First, productivity  growth  in the industrial  countries  has slowed  significantly  since the early 1970s. There
has been some recovery  since the mid-1980s  as investment-to-output  ratios increased, but there is much
uncertainty  about sustainability  of the resulting higher rates of productivity. Second, with population
growth continuing  to decline in most industrial countries and the cost of capital remaining high, the
efficiency with which resources are used becomes  even a more crucial factor in affecting  standards of
living in these countries  in the 1990s  than before. This means  that economic  reforms must continue and
costly  policy mistakes  be avoided. Third, in a global  context, there are large differences in productivity
performance  and the standard  of living. Except for a few countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, and to
some extent China, a large majority  of developing  countries  are not catching  up with the high income
countries,  and many are in fact falling behind. In contrast  to industrial  countries, much  of the economic
progress  in most developing  countries  that has taken place over the last 40 to 50 years, has been due to
2'  Maddison  (1982,  89).-12-
increases in the level of factor inputs (such as land, labor, and capital) in the production  process.  The
level of physical  capital  and skilled labor, and their rate of accumulation  have been the major constraints
on development  in these countries. With the strong possibility  of scarcity of capital in the 1990s,  there
are only a few feasible ways left for most developing  countries  to resume rapid growth and to increase
their level of standard  of living.  They should raise substantially  their overall economic  efficiency; and
invest more heavily in human capital to make their labor force more productive.  These will require
fundamental  economic  reforms as well as structural  changes. Since the rate of growth of labor force is
expected to accelerate in most of the developing countries  in the 1990s, a major challenge  to these
countries  will be to create employment  while  attempting  to raise productivity  of both labor and capital.-13-
4.  MODEL BASED SCENARIOS FOR THE 1990s!8
In this section, we analyze  quantitative  implications  of several  global  economic  scenarios  usiig the IMF's
MULTIMOD  (multi-region  econometric  model), and then compare and contrast the results with those
from other models where possible.  The scenarios  presented here are intended to capture some of the
main structural characteristics  of several possible global outcomes (as discussed in Section 3) in the
1990s.  Specifically,  these scenarios address the following  issues: (1) changes in industrial countries'
financial  and macroeconomic  conditions,  (2) changes  in the global  trade environment,  (3) changes  in the
international  oil market, and (4) the impact  of changes in domestic  policies of developing  countries  on
their growth prospects under varying  assumptions  about the global economic  environment.
Financial  Stress Scenario  for Japan and the U.S.
Given the financial  fragility  of the private sector in Japan and the U.S., serious financial  stress in
these  two countries  could  have a large negative  impact  on their economies,  and could produce  extensive
disruptions  to international  financial  markets  through "contagion  effects".  This scenario is constructed
on the assumption  that due to financial  stress in the U.S. and Japan the risk premia on the borrowing
rates in O!ese  two countries  could rise substantially  and that there will be higher demand for liquidity  in
both Japan and the U.S.2' Simulation  results suggest  that simultaneous  financial  stress in Japan and the
U.S.,  characterized  by much higher real interest rates and loss of confidence,  leads to a collapse of
private investment  and consumption. These changes  could  push the two economies  into a deep recession
in 1991-92. The impact  of the recession  in the U.S. and Japan on developing  countries is transmitted
through lower demand for exports by industrial  countries  and higher real interest rates.
The main simulation  results for this scenario are presented in Table 3.  The results show that in
the first year of recession the rate of growth of GNP drops by 2.9 percentage  points in the U.S., 2.8
percentage  points in Japan, 1.6 percentage  points in all industrial countries, and 0.8 percentage  points
in the developing  countries. However, there tends to be a quiclk  and simultaneous  recovery of growth
in industrial  countries  and developing  countries. This is mainly  due to the rapid adjustment  of inflation,
8/  The  simulations  reported  here  were  prepared  in March  1991. Since  actual  data  for 1991  were not available
at that timne  the scenarios reported here reflect preliminary  estimates from both the World Bank and IMF data
sources.
9'  We assume that the risk premia in the U.S. and Japan rise from 2 percent in baseline to 6 percent in the
scenario.  We  also  assume  4 percent  increase  in these  two  countries'  money  supply  target. Results  of the  simulation
are only for illustration.-14-
Table 3:  Financial  Stress Scenario for Japan  and the U.S.: Effects over one decade
Developing  Industrial
U.S.  Japan  countries  |  countries
Results  for year  1  -------------------  percent ------------------------
Real GNP growth
Base  1.7  3.7  4.2  2.4
Scenario  -1.2  0.9  3.4  0.8
Real Investment  growth
Base  2.8  4.4  8.4  3.3
Scenario  -10.0  -2.0  5.1  -1.4
Real Imports  Growth
Base  5.7  4.6  4.3  4.8
Scenario  1.4  0.3  -0.4  2.9
Real Short-term  Interest Rate
Base  3.7  3.4  ...  ...
Scenario  6.4  6.1
Deviations  in year 10
(Scenario minus Base case, bil. US$,  1980 prices
and dollar exchange rate)
Real GNP level  -68  -70  -16  -122
Real Investment level  -79  -77  -9  -132
Sources:  MULTIMOD  simulations.
adjustment  of inflation, long-run interest, and exchange  rates in both industrial  and developing  regions
due to the forward-looking  behavioral  specifications  in MULTIMOD. In spite  of improved  growth, GDP
and investment  levels never catch up with their base case levels.  In fact, the simulation  results indicate
the real GNP level of the industrial  countries  as a group in the year 2000 is lower by about $122 billion
(1980 $)  than in the baseline.
A similar financial  stress scenario  for the U.S. was presented  in a recent study by DRI. Oil prices
were assumed to "top $50 per barrel" in early 1991 and remain at this level through the second quarter
of 1991.  In DRI, higher inflation  and international  interest rates would force U.S. monetary  policy to
be tighter than the baseline (DRI). Collapse  in public confidence  pushes  the U.S. economy  into recession-15-
in 1991. Real GNP growth in the U.S. falls by about 3 percentage  points in 1991, imports growth by
6 percentage  points, and nominal interest rates rise by 150  basis points. 1°'
Permanent  Decrease  of U.S. Government  Spending  by 4 Percen' of GNP
This scenario implies  a contractionary  fiscal policy in the United  States in order to reduce the size
of public  dissavings. Government  expenditure  is assumed  to fall by 4 percent  of baseline  GNP every  year
below that in the baseline, amounting  to about 170 billioi,  real 1980  dollars per year on average during
the 1991-2000  period. As a result, the U.S. government  budget  deficit, which  averages  about  2.5 percent
of GNP in the baseline, is eliminated  by 1993. The elimination  of the deficit causes real interest rates
in the U.S. to fall by 100 basis points on average during the 1991-1995  period, compared with that in
the baseline.  In this scenario the deficit reappears in  1995, as tax revenues continue to fall due to
declining  output and tax rates." 1'  However,  the deficit as a percentage  of GNP remains well below that
in the baseline, with unchanged  tax rates. The rising government  budget  deficits after 1995  raise private
sector savings, due to the assumption  in MULTIMOD  that the private sector has perfect foresight  and
expects increases in future tax rates (i.e. the so-called Barro-Ricardian  effect).  On the other hand, the
U.S. export volume is steadily higher than baseline due to continuous  depreciation of the effective
exchange  rate, which leads to export-led  growth in the U.S.'2'
The final important  results of the simulation  show that a major reduction  in the U.S. budget  deficit
leads  to significantly  lower world interest  rates  and slightly  higher  financial  flows  to developing  countries.
Table 4 presents some  of the simulation  results. Although  in 1991,  output  of both the industrial  countries
and developing  countries  declines  significantly  (1.3 and 0.9 percent respectively),  they rise rapidly in the
1O'  DRI, Ten-year  Proiections. October 1990. The interest  rate here is yield on a long-term  government  bond.
ii'  In MULTIMOD,  the default  assumption  is that tax rates  are changed  to prevent  the stock of government  bond
from rising explosively  relative  to the baseline  GNP level. However,  the model  could have been simulated  also by
permanently  lowering  the rate of bonds to GNP by 4%.
12'  In his recent  paper, 'Rx for America:  Export-Led  Growth.' International  Economic  Insight, Jan/Feb 1991,
C. Fred  Bergsten  concludes  that  export-led  growth rnay  be the only feasible  strategy  for the US in the 1990s,  when
neither  fiscal nor  monetary  tools  will be available.-16-
Table 4: Decrease  of U.S. Government Spending by 4% of GNP
(De-iations from Baseline)
United States  Year I  Year 2 - 5  Year 6 - 10
Real GDP growth rate  -3.00  1.10  -0.12
(percentage point)
Real GNP level (1980 $ billion)  -114  12  34
Gross private invetment  level (%)  3.40  4.63  2.86
Exports  of goods  and services level  (%)  0.80  3.28  1.32
Imports of goods and services  level (%)  -7.00  -3.83  -1.18
GNP  deflator (percentage  points)  -1.1  -0.3  -0.3
Short-term  interest rate (basis  points)  -40  -155  -4
Long-term  real interest rate  -110  -113  8
(basis points)
Nominal  effective  exchange  ratc ()  -4.40  -3.45  -0.52
Developing  Countries
Real  GDP  growth rate  -0.90  0.30  -0.02
(percentage point)
Real GDP level (1980 $ billion)  -26  1  9
Exports of goods and services level (%)  -2.60  -0.05  0.24
Imports of goods  and services level t%)  -3.60  1.03  0.68
Net  debt level (S bil.)  2  3  5
Net debt/nominal  GDP  -0.50  -0.33  0.02
All Industrial  Countries
Real GDP growth rate  -1.30  0.50  -0.10
(percentage  poin;)
Real  GDP level (%)  -1.30  0.10  0.30
Sources: Authors' calculations,  based on MULTIMOD  simulations.-17-
rest of the simulation  period.3'  The main reason for this economic  recovery is the rise in investment
and consumption  due to lower interest rates.  Nevertheless,  based on these results the long-term  effect
o. this U.S. fiscal shock on the growth of developing  countries is small.
Oil Price Scenarios
In this section, several scenarios concerning  different time paths of oil prices in the 1990s  are
presented.  The volatility of oil prices and its longer-term  effects on world output, interest rate, and
inflation  is analyzed. Specifically,  two different  time paths for the oil price, one volatile and one smooth,
but with same average price, have been designed to illustrate the effects of volatility on the global
economic  conditions in the 1990s.  In the high volatility case oil prices in the 1990s range between
$20/bbl  and $55/bbl. This scenario may represent  future uncertainty  about world oil prices if political
and social instability  in the Middle  East were to continue. In contrast,  the smooth time path of oil prices
assumes  consistently  lower oil prices than in the baseline, ranging  between  $17/bbl  and $24/bbl, possibly
brought by a new political order in the Middle  East and greater cooperation  between  oil producers and
consumers. Under this scenario, real oil prices are assumed  to be nearly constant.
Sharp changes  in oil prices, whether up or down, could  have disproportionately  large effects on
potential  output in the industrial countries. As Bruno and Sachs (1985) show, a rise in the price of oil
leads to a substitution  away from oil towards capital, labor, and other imported inputs.  Under the
assumption  of constant elasticity of substitution  (CES) for the aggregate  production function both real
wage and capital  stock will fall in the long run, as will the investment  rate, and growth of technological
progress  and factor  productivity. Consequently,  output  falls. Volatile  oil prices cause  volatile export  and
13/  According to Jeffrey  A. Frankel, 'Ambiguous Policy Multipliers  in Theory and in Empirical Models,"
Chapter Two in Empirical Macroeconomics  for Interdependent  Economics,  (ed. Bryant and others), Brookings
Institute,  Washington,  D.C.,  1988  (pp.  17-26),  a reduction  in government  spending  leads to the decline  in the level
of real GNP, short-term  interest rate, and inflation rates in the second  year after the shock.  He summarizes  the
simulation  results from various models  of a decrease  in the U.S. government  spending  by 1 percent of GNP as
follows:
Real GNP  Short-term
(% deviation  interest rates  Inflation rates
(from baseline)  (percentage  points)  (percentage  points
DRI  -2.1  -1.6  -0.4
OECD  -1.1  -1.7  -0.6
Wharton  -1.4  -1.1  -0.3
Project  LINK  -1.2  -0.2  -0.5-18-
Table 5:  Transmission  of volatilities  in oil prices, 1991 to 2000
(smooth  ou price  scenario  minus volatile  oil price  scenario) 1/
Difference  in level  Difference  in
Developing  countries  or growth  rate  standard deviation
Real GDP growth rate (percentage point)  +0.28  -0.20
GNP  deflator  (percentage  point)  -1.25  -3.70
Export  price  deflator  (percentage  point)  . -17.00
Import  price  deflator  (percentagc  point)  -12.50
Price index of commodities  1.70  -1.30
Real GDP level in 2000 (1980 S billion)  + ll
Industrial  countries
Real GDP (growth  rate)  +0.03  -0.53
Short-term  interest rate  (basis points)  -43  -33
GNP deflator (percentage  point)  -0.56  -0.69
Real GDP level in 2000  +27
Source: Author's calculations  from MULTIMOD  simulation  results.
1/  Model is simulated from  1991 to 2015.
import  prices, and unstable interest, and output growth rates.  Table 5 shows that the volatility of the
world oil prices increases, so does the volatility  in GDP growth, inflation,  and interest rates.
Alternatively,  we consider  two other time paths of oil prices in order to better measure the impact
of volatility  (as opposed  to the level effect). First, we assume  that the two paths have the same average
price of oil, abou. $27/bbl.  Second, one price path is assumed to have a larger standard deviation
($2.3/bbl) than the other ($1.51bbl). The simulation  results indicate  that volatility of oil prices have a
significant  impact on key macroeconomic  variables even if the long-term average price of oil is aeld
constant (see table 5a).
Finally, we consider  a simple  oil price shock scenario whose  results can be compared  to those in
other models. In this scenario, the oil price is assumed  to increase  by $10.  Government  expenditure  is
held unchanged  in real terms and monetary policy is assumed  to be non-accommodating.  The results
from MULTIMOD  simulations  together with those from the OECD's INTERLINK  model  are presented
in table 5b.-19-
Table  Sa.  Effects of volatility  of oil prices  on the  industrial  countries
(cumulative  deviation  of  the  1990s)
GDP growth rate (percentage point)  0.4
Inflation rate (percentage point)  -0.5
Short-term interest  rate (basis points)  -40
Real GNP level at 2000 (USS bil.  1980 price)  38
Sources:  Authors' calculation based on simulations of MULTIMOD.
I  Smooth time path minus volatile time path of oil price.
Table  5b.  Effects of a $10 oil price  increase:  alternative  models
"leviation from baseline)
MULTIMOD  It  OECD (INTERLINK)Z'
Industrial  countries  1990  |1991  1992  1990|  1991  1992
Inflation rate 3  (percentage point)  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.21  0.89  0.19
Output level (%)  -0.4  -0.5  -0.4  -0.13  -0.97  -0.93
Interest rates  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.42  0.78  0.13
Current account balance ($ bil.)  -44.9  -47.9  -47.1  -10.89  -22.06  -7.91
Sources:  Authors'  calculation based on simulations of MULTIMOD,  and OECD.
'  In MULTIMOD,  it assumed that government expenditure is unchanged in real terms.
2'  Assumed tighter fiscal policy in INTERLINK, nominal government expenditure unchanged.
3/  Absorption deflator  in MULTIMOD and consumer prices in INTERLINK.-20-
The simulation  results of the two models are roughly similar:  Inflation in industrial countries,
output  rates fall, interest  rates rise, and their combined  current account balance  deteriorates. In general,
however, MULTIMOD  tends to produce larger short-term effects  than the INTERLINK  model. Price
expectations  adjust quickly  in MULTIMOD  because  of its forward-iooking  properties. However, actual
prices,  such as  wages, adjust gradually because of  assumed price  stickiness.  For  example, in
MULTIMOD,  the impact  of this oil shock on inflation  is twice as large as that produced  by the OECD
INTERLINK  model in the first year after the shock. But the impact  in MULTIMOD  disappears  quickly,
while in the INTERLINK  model inflation  worsens further by a 0.9 percentage  point in the second year
after the shock.
AJHigh  Productivity  Scenario  for the World Economy
Under the high productivity scenario, industrial countries follow a  policy mix of  monetary
expansion  and fiscal contraction  to lower interest rates and raise capacity  output. The real interest rate
is lowered  on average by 200 basis points.  Risk premia on the business  borrowing rate is set to zero,
compared with 2 percent -i the base case. Oil prices are assumed  to follow a smooth path as discussed
above, implying no change in real terms throughout  the 1990s. Total factor productivity  in industrial
countries is assumed to grow at about 3 percent per year.
Given the international  economic environment, we construct two alternative scenarios for the
developing  countries. First, a trade and private finance  package (similar to the one assumed in Section
2) is considered. We assume  that the current GATT negotiation  brings about  a more liberal international
trading system.  Moreover, the level of direct foreign investment  (DFI) flows to developing  countries  is
assumed  to increase by an average of about $28 billion in the 1990s, a doubling  of the average level in
the baseline. This, together with better domestic  policies  (i.e. a stable macroeconomic  condition, liberal
trade policy, market-oriented  reforms, and human resource  development),  is assumed to yield a better
supply response in the export sector of the developing countries and leads to an increase (about 2
percentage  points) in the rate of growth of volume of exports sup,Aied  b) the developing  countries. In
the second scenario, we assume that domestic policy reforms in the developing countries raise their
national  saving rate by about I percentage  point above  that in the baseline.  This, in turn increases  the
rate of investment. Furthermore, we assume  that the increased investment  rate raises the growth  rate of
productivity  in the developing  countries  as a group.
The high productivity  case for the global economic  environment  with the augmented  trade and
finance package for developing countries leads to higher imports and investment  in the developing-21-
countries  followed  by a 1.3 percentage  point increase  in their average rate ot GDP growth. In this case,
DFI flows double from the base case, but domestic investment  shows little change compared with the
baseline. This would imply an improvement  in productivity  of investment  (a decline in ICOR). On the
other hand,  the high case with better domestic  policies in the developing  countries leads to a significant
increase  in domestic  investment. Gross  domestic  investment  level is on average  almost 15  percent higher
than the base case level.  Higher investment  leads to higher export and imports. Additionally,  the rate
of growth of real GDP in the developing  rtgion is nearly 2 percentage  points higher compared with the
base case.  (A more detailed  result is presented  in Annex 3.)
Table 6  exhibits period average deviations from the baseline for some key macroeconomic
variables. Under the high productivity  case (with  no change  in developing  country  policies), GNP growth
in the industrial  region increases  by almost 1 percent per year.  Due to the lower uncertainty  (lower risk
premia) and lower inflation, the investment  to GNP ratio rises steadily from 20 percent in 1990 to 26
percent in 2000. The combination  of "high" performance  in the industrial  region  and lower world interest
rates leads to a higher rate of growth in the developing  countries as a group.  A higher demand for
imports  by industrial countries  and a higher level of financial  flows to the developing  countries increase
flows to the developing  countries  increase  the level of exports of the developing  countries  substantially.
Under the high case scenario, the ratios of exports and imports to GDP of the developing  countries are
much  higher than in the base case, indicating  greater integration  of the developing  region into the world
economy.
T'he simulation results of this high productivity scenario demonstrate that developing country
domestic  policies  are crucial  determinants  of their long-term  growth  path. In our example,  if developing
countries followed better domestic policies, they would enjoy an additional 1.3 percentage points in
economic  growth per year, given  the same external condition. Also implied  by the simulations  for the
high case scenario (alternative  I in table 6) is the superiority  of non-debt-creating  flows (DFI) to debt-
creating, interest-sensitive  flows to the developing  countries.1 4'
141  The superiority  holds even if profit remittances  are high or rising. This is because  DFI's profit remittances
tend to be mainly  pro-cyclical  in nature, while interest  payments  arising from  debt-crea.ding  flows tend to be counter-
cyclical,  particularly  since the mid-1970s.-22-
Table  6; lligh  productivity simulations
(period average  deviation from baseliie)
i  Developing  *'outrSieS  'tYear  I - 5  Year 6 - 10  Yeur  I  - 1)
Real GDP  (growth rate)
High case  0.46  0.i8  0.52
High Alternative I  .1  1.12  1.46  1.29
High Alternative  2  It  2.3S  1.32  1  .8
GDP level (1980 S billion)
High case  53.5  128.6  91.1
High Alternative  I  121.7  418.7  270.2
High Alternative  2  257.3  689.6  473.4
Gross  investment (%)
High case  3.14  6.00  4.57
High Alternative I  2.62  -2.3  0.16
High Alternative  2  7.72  15.02  11.37
Export of goods & services (%)
High case  4.60  11 38  7.99
High Alternative I  10.26  26.32  18.29
High Alternative 2  15.8  30.22  23.01
nImpotts  of goods & services (%)
High case  6.18  13.74  9.96
High Alternative 1  7.72  13.48  10.6
High Alternative 2  9.84  21.38  15.61
Industrial  Countries
Real GDP (growth rate)
High case  0.74  1.04  0.89
High Alternative 1  0.82  0.78  0.8
High Alternative  2  0.84  1.12  0.98
GDP level (1980 S billion)
High case  314.3  893.2  603.8
High Alternative 1  352.6  834.0  593.0
High Alternative  2  369.2  943.0  656.0
Long-term real interest rate
High catse  -0 1  -1.42  -0.66
High Altcrnative 1  -0.3  -1.54  -0.92
High Alternative 2  -0.46  -1.8  -1.13
!f  Alternative 1:  High case in the industrial countries with higher world trade growth and higher level of
FDI to the developing countries.
Z'  Alternative 2  High case in the industrial countriea  with better domestic  policies in the developing
countries.-23-
A Low Productivity  Scenario for the World Economy
Under the low productivity  scenario, Japan and the U.S. are assumed to face a serious financial
crisis with "contagion effects" that engulf other industrial countries: real interest rates are very high,
indicating  extreme  uncertainty; risk plemia on the business  borrowing  rate is twice that in the baseline;
oil prices are assumed  to be highly  volatile retlecting continuing  political problems  in the Middle East;
and total factor productivity  growth in the industrial  countries  is, on average, 2 percent lowei than in the
baseline.
In this scenario, the industrial countries' average growth rate of real GDP declines by 0.9
percentage  point  per year, while their average inflation  rate rises by 0.4 percentage  point per year, from
the baseline.  As a group, the average growth rate of the developing  countries fall by 0.4 percentage
points per year compared with the baseline.  Under the assumption  that very little capital flows to the
developing  region (i.e. DFI falls to only half that of the baseline level) and that the collapse of GATT
negotiations  lowers the developing  countries' rate of growth of real exports by about  2 percent annually
compared with the baseline, the developing  countries' average rate of growth of real GDP declines by
0 6 percentage  point.
Under an alternative  scenario, in addition  to low productivity  growth in the industrial countries,
we assume wide-spread  slippage  of domestic policy  reforms in the developing  countries,  where national
savings  and investment  rates decline  and lead to lower productivity  growth in these countries  as a group.
Period average  deviations  from the baseline  for some key macroeconomic  variables  can be found in Table
7 (Detailed  simulation  results are presented in Annex 3).  In the industrial countries, volatile  oil prices
reduce output and raise inflation. High real interest rates, declining  investment,  deteriorating  terms of
trade, and weakening  domestic demand  result in a I percent drop in their average rate of growth of real
GNP through the 1990s. 1 '  The prolonged slowdown in industrial countries reduces the lending to
developing countries by an average of 20 billion dollars per year.  Both export and imports of the
developing  countries  fall, and by 2000, the volume  of exports  are down by 12 percent, while  the volume
of imports  are lowered  by 16  percent compared  with levels in the base case. Finally, the average growth
rate of investment  in the developing  countries  declines by about I percentage  point per year compared
to the baseline.  As a  region, developing countries experience a daclining of GDP growth of 0.6
percentage  point per year from the base case.
15/  In MULTIMOD  oil serves as an input to production  function  and hence sharp changes in oil prices are
modelled  as supply-side  shock.-24-
Table 7: Low productivity  scenario (period average deviation from baseline)
Devloping Countries  -pAr  1 C  par  6  I  (I  YP  r I  . 1
Real GDP (growth rate)
Low cape  !'  -0.52  -0.34  -0.43
Low Alternative  I  2'  -0.7  -0.36  -0.53
Low Altermative  2'  -1.88  -0 56  -1.27
Low Alternative  3  Y  1.24  0.16  0.7
GDP  level (1980 $  billion)
Low case  -63.1  -138.8  -100.9
Low Alternative  1  -87.3  -175.7  -131.5
LowAlternative2  -203.1  -436.3  -319.7
Low AIternative  3  116.2  29!.3  203.8
|Gross  invcesent (%)
Low case  -3.60  -6.00  -4.80
Low Alternative  1  -5.48  -6.92  -6.20
Low Alternative  2  -5.22  -10.8  -8.01
Low Alternative  3  0.02  1.08  0.55
Exporu of goods  and services  (%)
Low case  -5.5  -9.66  -7.58
Low Alternative  1  -7.7  -11.92  -9.81
Low Alternative  2  -14.38  -22.68  -18.53
Low Alternative  3  4.84  6.58  5.71
Imports  of goods and services  (%)
Low case  -7.18  -12.96  -10.07
Low Alternative  1  -10.42  -15.64  -13.03
Low Alternative  2  -10.6  *'9.62  -15.1
Low Alternative  3  -3.58  -5 90  4.74
Industrial  Countries
Real GDP (growth  rate)
Low case  -0.96  -0.88  -0.92
Low Alternative  I  -1.0  -0.90  -0.95
Low Alternative  2  -1.1  -0.90  -1.0
GDP level (1980  $ billion)
Low case  -382.1  -927.1  -654.6
Low Alterrative  1  -388.1  -912.9  -650.5
Low Alternative  2  419.2  -969.1  -694.1
Long-term  real interet rate
Low case  0.72  2.4  1.56
Low Alternative  1  0.74  2.38  1.56
Low  A1terrative  2  1.68  3.1  2.39
1  Low productivity  sceorio for the industrial  countries.
a'  (I) with decrasing FDI to LDCs and unfavormble  GA1Tr.
>  (I) with poor dornesic policies  of the developmg  countries.
I(1)  with good donestic policies  of the developing  countries.-25-
Consequently,  if these countries were to implement  "good" domestic policies, raise productivity
growth, and succeed  in preventing  private investment  from failing, then their GDP growth rate as a group
increases  by U.7 percentage  point per year compared  with the baseline (as opposed to a decline of 0.6
percentage point under the poor policies assumption),  despite the deterioration in the international
economic  environment.
Interaction  Between  External Economic  Environment  and Domestic  Policies
While there has been some research  work on the nature of transmission  of growth impulses  from
the industrial to developing countries, less attention  has been paid to the issue of how the developing
countries  should  choose an appropriate  mix of domestic  policies  so that they can adjust  quickly  to various
external  shocks, while sustaining  growth and investment.
Institutional  performance  is an important  factor in determining  a developing  country's response  to
external  shocks. The ability  of countries  to quickly  adopt and implement  effective  domestic  policies in
response  to a shock, such as the 1979-80  oil shock, is a measure  of institutional  efficacy. Countries  such
as Thailand and Indonesia  that quickly  adopted sound  and credible  domestic  policies in the early 1980s
were able to make gradual adjustments  and avoid severe recession. On the other hand, countries  such
as Argentina  and Brazil that lacked credible  domestic  policies  and suffered from the debt overhang  were
engulfed  in severe economic  recession.
While in the preceding section we considered  domestic policy alternatives for the developing
countries  (various global economic  scenarios  were combined  with domestic  policy mixes, ranging  from
"very good" to "poor" domestic  policies), this part of the discussion  sums up the relevant results from
simulation of various scenarios presented above, focusing on the interaction between the external
economic  environment  and domestic  policies  of the developing  countries. Table 8 gives brief descriptions
of policy assumptions  and their implementation.
These numerical  results tend to confirm  the claim that while the developing  countries' long-term
economic  prospects may be affected  by major changes  in the external  conditions,  they depend largely  on
the success or failure of their own policies. Table 9 presents a "multiplier  matrix" for the developing
countries,  generated  from the simulations  of various combinations  of external  circumstances  and internal
policies.  We find that when holding the external environment  condition unchanged, better domestic
policies improve  the developing  countries'  average  growth  by about 1.2 percentage  points per year. Also
shown in the table are simulation  results from the effects  of "very good" domestic policies (with an-26-
Table 8.  Assumptions  on external economic
environment  and the developing  countries'
L__________________  domestic policies for the 1990s
I  Low Case  Baseline  High Case
External economic  Serious  financial  crisis in U.S.  The financial stress in U.S.  Industrial countries follow a
conditions:  and  Japan;  very  high  real  and  Japan  is  gradually  policy  mix  of  monetary
interest  rates  reflecting  reduced; real  interest rates  expansion  and fiscal  contrac-
extreme uncertainties; highly  fall  and productivity  improves  tion to  lower  interest rates
volatile  oil  prices  due  to  gradually;  GATT  negotiations  and raise capacity  output; oil
continuing political problems  achieve modest success; oil  prices are lower  than baseline
in  the  Middle  East;  GATT  prices rapidly return to pre-  and  constant in  real  terms
negotiations  collapse;  very  war  levels  and  then  are  throughout  the 1990s; GA17
little  capital  flows  to  the  constant in  real terms; low  negotiation brings  about  a
developing  region.  inflation rates  in  industrial  more  liberal  international
countries  and  improved  trading system; more capital
exchange  rate stability.  flows  to  the  developing
countries.
Domestic  policies  A large number of developing  Policy orientations aimed at  Liberal trade policy; tariffs
in the developing  countries fail  to  implement  stabilizing  the economic  and  and  nontariff  barriers  are
countries:  extended  reforms;  excessive  financial  situation;  most deve-  removed; developing coun-
government spending; tariffs  loping countries manage to  tries implement  new policies
and  nontariff  barriers  are  implement  intended  policies.  to  maintain  political  and
increased;  less  human  resource  economic  stabilities  while
development.  continuing  the  market-
oriented  reforms;  new
government  programs  for
human  resource  development.
Implementation:  Compared  with baseline, risk  Compared  with baseline,  real
premia in the U.S. and Japan  interest rate  is  lowered on
is twice as high; total factor  average by 200 basis points;
productivity  growth  in  the  oil  prices  range  between
industrial  countries  is,  on  $17/bbl  and  $24/bbl;  risk
average, 2 percent lower; oil  premia  on  the  business
prices  in  the  1990s range  borrowing rate in G-7 is set
between $20/bbl and $50/bbl;  to zero; productivity  growth
DFI  to  LDCs  fall  by  half;  is about 3 percent per year;
growth  of  real  exports  of  DFI  flows  to  developing
LDCs  is  2  percent  lower;  countries is increased  by an
savings to GDP ratio in deve-  average  of  about  US$30
loping countries  as a group  de-  billion in  1990s; growth of
creases,  so  does the  invest-  real  exports of  LDCs is  2
ment;  lower  productivity  percent higher on  average;
growth in  developing  countries  higher  productivity growth
as a group.  for developing  countries.-27-
Table 9:  Inpact  of Alternative External Circurnstances and
Domestic Policies  on Long-term GDP gro"th
of Developing  Countries, 1990s 1/
(percentage point deviation from the baseline*)
Domestic policies of
developing  countries  External economic  environment
Low  Base  High
Better (very good)  0.7  1.23  1.9
Average (good)  -0.6  0  0.6
Poor  -1.3  -1.0  -0.5
Sources:  Authors'  calculations.
*  Baseline is defined as good domestic policies and  base scenario for
the external economic environment.
1/  In MULTIMOD,  the developing country bloc does not have policy
variables explicitly modeled.  Hence, to stimulate domestic policies in
developing countries it is necessary to effect this through adjusting
behavion l parameters of the model.
Table  9a:  Impact  of Alternative  External  Circumstances
(FDI and world trade) on Long-tertn GDP growth
of  the Developing Countries,  1990s
(percentage point deviation from the baseline)
External economic environment
Domestic policies of  Low with:  I  High with:
developing countries  low FDI and  high FDI and
protectionism  Base  less protectionism
Average (good)  -0.5  0  1.3
Sources:  Authors'  talculations.-28-
increasing  saving rate, higher investment  rate, and faster productivity  growth). These policies result in
a higher average growth rate for the developing  countries  than when the external conditions  alone are
assumed  to improve (higher DFI level and more liberal international  trade system). In sum, given our
assumptions  concerning  the domestic  and external  policies,  our results indicate  that the impact  of domestic
policies  on long-term  growth  of developing  countries  seem  to be about  twice  as large as those attributable
to changes in external conditions when the stance of domestic policies are held fixed.  There are,
however, two  major caveats which imply caution in  interpreting the  results and  argue against
generalization. First, these results  tend to hold only on an aggregate  basis as individual  country  situations
differ  considerably  from one another  (not only because  of domestic  policies  but also, among  other factors,
due to differences  in international  linkages). Second,  the results  are obviously  sensitive  to the magnitude
of change introduced in  both the domestic policies and external environment.  Nevertheless, the
magnitude  of policy shocks  that have  been implemented  in the scenarios  presented  above are in line with
the post war historical  experience.-29-
5.  CONCLUSIONS
The  simulation  results presented  in this paper  point  to two potentially  important  findings  which we believe
are relevant  to analysis  of the prospects  of the developing  economies  in the 1990s. First, changes in the
international  economic  environment  have a significant  effect on the developing countries' long-term
economic  growth. The main channels  of transmission  are international  trade an,' finance. Historically,
financial  conditions  have supported  growth in the developing  countries. When  growth accelerated  in the
industrial  countries international  trade increased  more rapidly and, because  of a higher level of savings
in the industrial  countries,  more  financial  resources  became  available  for the developing  countries. Thus,
growth impulses  from the real side of the world economy  were reinforced  by financial developments.
During the periods of slump in the industrial  countries,  the growth retarding impulses  from the real side
were countered by a decline in real interest rates as the investment  demand in the industrial  countries,
in a synchronized  fashion, fell below  the supply  of savings  in those countries. Thus to an extent, the real
interest rate decline together with continuing  financial flows to the developing  countries cushioned  the
negative impact of the recession  in the industrial countries on the developing countries. These inter-
relations seem to have undergone  a fundamental  change in the 1980s as economic  slowdowns in the
industrial countries have taken place while real interest rates increased and supply of funds to the
developing  countries  dried up.
On the other hand, during the periods of economic  expansion  in the industrial countries, higher
growth of output and trade have taken place while  real interest rates remained  high.  This is explained
by the fact that rec  it expansions  have been  fueled mainly  by sharp increases  in investment  demand  (and,
in some countries,  through fiscal expansion),  while  private saving rates were declining  and public sector
dissaving  remained  large.
Secondly, based on our simulation  results, the impact of changes in domestic policies of the
developing countries on their long-term growth is substantially larger than the long-term effects of
changes in the international  economic  environment. Although  our results are tentative and need to be
interpreted cautiously, a simple "rule of thumb" that emerges is that the magnitude  of the effect of
reasonable changes in domestic policieF  on long-term growth may be at least twice as large as those
coming from reasonable  changes  in the external  economic  environment.-30-
ANNEX I
Annex 1.
Regression Analysis  of External  Determinants
of GDP Growth  on the Developing Countries,  1966-88
Statistics
GDP  Real  Oa
GDP  grow-th  world  prices  RI10  c
Intercept  growth  g  OECLD  interest  dunuwuy
OECD  (-I)  rate a  bl  DW
j  2
All L.x  & Middle  3.192  0.294  0 399  -0.182  0  10,
Income Countries  k4.33)  (1.69)  (2 44)  (-1.82)  (13)  437  1.21
By Analytical Groups
Oil Exporters  2.288  0.486  0 5s0  -0.571  -0 842  -0 477
(1.65)  (1.23)  (1.56)  (-3.3)  (-.50)  (-2 1)  .340  1 97
Oil Importers  3 266  0 333  0.379  -0.302  -0 335
(4.69)  (2.06)  (2 49)  (-3.24)  (- 43)  .570  2.10
By Geographic  Croups
Sub-SaharanAfrica  1954  0.Q15  0 455  -0.170  1 187
(I  04)  (033)  (1.09)  (-.67)  ( S66)  -.052  1.60
1 985  0.461  -0.170  1 1$4
(1.26)  (I1  29)  (-.69)  (627)  .006  1.60
excl.  Nigeria  3.118  0.147  -0.120
(3.04)  (.659)  (-.75)  .006  2 01
East Asia  4.463  1.065  0.200  4.961  .268
(2.77)  (2.79)  ( 741)  (-2.73)  (1.68)  .327  2.05
5.036  1.101  4.990  0.295
(3 55)  (2 93)  (-2.78)  (1.94)  .347  1.99
South Asia  6.144  -0.707  0 292  0.122  4.732
(3.64)  (-1.78)  (.779)  (.534)  (-2.47)  127  2.02
EMENA  3 958  0 412  (  189  -0.471  4) 034
(4.16)  (1.84)  (.396)  (-3.65)  032)  .457  2.01
3.952  0.416  0  186  -0.471
(4.38)  (2.16)  (.991)  (-3.76)  .488  2.00
Latin America  0.933  0.808  0 540  -0.504  3.062
(.815)  (2.99)  (2 13)  (-3.24)  (:.36)  637  1.59
1 504  0.511  0.777  -0.493
(1.20)  (I  92)  (2 99)  (-2.84)  .545  1.70
Note:  Figures in parenthesis  are t-sta:istics.
aI  One period lagged.
b/  Dummy is set to  I for year  1974. 1979, and 1980, zero others'se
c/  Firat order auto-correlation correction.-31-
ANNEX  2
Brief Description of GEM/CFM and MIULTIMOD  Mlodels
CFM (Capital Flows Model) is a model  of debt, creditworthiness,  and borrowing  for about  ninety
countries in which import capacity of most deveioping  countries is determined as a residual in their
balance-of-payments  identity.  Creditworthiness  indicators as well as domestically-imposed  financing
constraints  play crucial roles in determining  the levels of private and non-concessional  official  flows and
debt services. GDP growth is affected  through  a reduced-form  relationship  with imports  and investment.
The model is not a full-linked  system but is simply solved as a set of separate "small-country'  models.
CFM consists about 900 equations  and is installed  in the TROLL system.
GEM (Global Economic Model) is a 640 equation macroeconomic  model covering the whole
world  economy,  but focusing  particularly  on the seven major industrial  countries. The model is authored
by and maintained  at NIESR  in London. A copy of the model which is maintained  at IEC, World  Bank,
is used to produce forecasts and analyze events and policy options in the world economy.  GEM is
divided into sixteen sectors.  Each of the G7 country sectors contains around 60 variables covering
individual  components  of demand, price indices, exchange rates and interest rates, trade and current
account. The remaining  sectors cover  the other industrial  countries,  OPEC, Asia, Latin America, Africa,
the Centrally Planned Economies and Miscellaneous  developing countries.  These sectors contain
equations  for trade volumes  and prices, which depend  on five commodity  price indices."
IMF's MULTIMOD (Multi-Region Econometric Miodel)  was designed to analyze the effects of
industrial country policies on major macroeconomic  variables, both in the developed and developing
worlds. The model focuses on the transmission  of policy effects and, to a limited extent, can be used
to evaluate  the spillover  to developing  countries. MULTIMOD  includes G7 countries, the bloc of the
smaller industrial  countries,  and the bloc for rest of the world, which is further divided into net creditor
(mainly  oil exporters)  and net  debtor developing  countries. The forward-looking  behavioral  specification
in MULTIMOD  is one of its distinguishing  features  which allows quick  adjustment  of expected  inflation,
the interest rates, and the exchange rates in the industrial countries.  Debt flows to the developing
countries  are determined  by the expectation  of their ability  to pay and is conceptually  similar  to the CFM
model in the area.  The model was designed  as a simulation  model, hence, does not make unconditional
or "baseline"  forecasts.Y'
.1  See National  Institute Econonic  Review, February  1990, page 51.
2'  See 'MULTIMOD  Mark II: A Revised  and Extended  Model' by Paul Masson, Steven Symansky,  and Guy
Meredith, IMF Occasional  Paper 71, July 1990.- 2-
ANNEX  3
Selected Simulation Results
Notations  as shown in the following  tables*:
(1)  MULTIZ_GATTFDI  - Scenario  of high FDI and less protectionism.
(2)  MULTIZ_DCHIGHS  - Scenario  of better domestic  policies of developing  countries.
(3)  MULTIZ_DCLOWS  - Scenario  of poor domestic  policies of developing  countries.
* More detailed  simulation  results are available  upon request.-33-
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1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
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Real  GOP  %)  ........................  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7 Real  GOP  (growth  rate)  ..............  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.1  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 Real  GNP  (%)  ........................  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.5  0,6  0.6  0.6  O.7  0.7  0.7  0.8
Domestic  demand  M ...............  0.0  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.L  1.3  1.5  1.7  7.9  2.1  2.3 Consumption-expenditure  (%)  .......  0.0  0.3  0.5  3.8  1.1  3.3  1.6  1.9  2.1  2.4  2.6 Gross  private  investment  (%)  ......  0.0  1.2  1.5  1.7  1.9  2.1  2.3  2.6  2.8  3.1  3.3 E.ports  of goods  and  sorvices  (%).  0.0  0.9  0.8  1.1  1.2  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.1  1.2 Imports  of goods  and  services  (%).  C.0  1.3  1.8  2.5  3.1  3.7  4.4  5.1  5.8  6.5  7.2
Real  GNP  (80Sb)  ...................  0.0  34.7  40.9  57.0  66.6  68.9  77.0  84.9  91.9  96.7  101.9 Real  GOP  (80Sb)  ...................  0.0  33.7  39.7  55.5  64.1  65.0  71.7  78.1  83.?  87.3  91.3 Consumption  expenditure  (805b) ....  0.0  37.5  34.7  56.3  77.0  96.6  117.7  340.3  164.i  188.5  213.7 Gross  private  investment  (80Sb)  ..  0.0  27.3  33.8  40.1  4?  1  55.4  62.9  70.6  78.9  87.5  95.3 Real  net  e.ports  (80b)  ...........  0.0  -11.2  -28.8  -40.9  -59.9  -B7.1  -108 9  -132.8  -159.3  -188.7  -217.7 Real  Uo.Vt  e.penditure  (80Sb)  .....  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Government
Gen.  govVt  financial  balance  (Sb) ...  -0.0  14.1  19.S  27.4  32.5  32.r  34 0  a4.3  33.7  32.2  30.6 Gen.  govvt  financial  balance/GNP  (9)  -0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 Government  debt  (Sb)  ......  .........  . -0.0  -61.4  -82.5  -115.5  -155.5  -195  5  -236  2  -275  0  -310  5  -341.5  -368.7 Government  debt/GNP ........  -0.0  -0.1  -0.2  -0.4  -0.5  -0.6  -0  7  -0.7  -0.8  -0.8  -0.8
Money  I  Interest  Retes
Money  supply  (%)  ....................  0.0  -1.5  -1.6  -1.8  -2.0  -2.2  -2.4  2.5  -2,5  -2.5  2.4 Money  supply  (growth  rate)  ..........  0.0  -1.7  -0.1  -0.3  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.1 Money  target  (%)  ....................  -0.0  -1.5  -1.6  -I.8  -2.1  -2.4  -2.t  -2.9  -3.0  -2.9  -2.8 Short-term  interest  rate  ............  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.5  -0./  -0  8  -0.9  -1.0 Long-term  interest  rate  .............  -0.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.6  -0.7  -0.8  -0.9  -1.0  -).0  -).0
Prices  I  Supply
Absorption  deflator  (X1  .............  0.0  -1.3  -1.5  -1.8  -2.1  -2.6  -2.9  -3.3  -3.7  -4.0  -4.3 Absorption  deflator  (inflation  rate)  0.0  -1.3  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4  -0.3  -0.3 GNP  deflator  (  ...  0.0  -1.2  -1.2  -t.3  -1.5  -1.7  -2.0  -2.2  -2.4  -2.b  -2.? Export  price  deflator-(%)  .............  0.0  -1.3  -1.3  -3.4  -1.6  -1.9  -2.2  -2.4  -2.7  -2.9  -3.0 Import  price  deflator  (%)  ...........  0.0  -1.9  -2.5  -3.3  -4.1  -5.1  -5.9  -6.7  -7.5  -8.3  9.0 Capacity  utilization  rate  ...........  0.0  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2 Long-term  real  interest  rate  ........  0.0  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3  -0.4  -0.6  -0.7  -0.8  -0.9
International  Accounts
Trade  balance  (Sb)  ..................  -0.0  7.5  9.3  22.6  30.6  31.5  34.2  35.3  34.7  32.1  33.4 Current  account  balance  (Sb)  ........  0.0  7.5  9.6  23.3  32.6  35.6  40.7  44.6  47.1  47.8  52.5 Net foreign  assets  (Sb)  .............  0.0  7.5  17.1  40.4  73.0  108.6  149.4  194.0  241.2  289.0  341.5
As  a percent  of nominal  GNP
Trade  balance .....................  -0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 Current  account  balance ...........  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 Net foreign  assets ................  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.6  0.7  0.8  0 9  1.0DSET  MULTIZZGATTFDI
Deviations  of MULTIZ_GATTFDI  from  MULTIZ_CONTROL
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Net  Oebtor  Countries
National Income
Real  GOP (S)  .0.0  0.6  1.1  1.e  2.6  3.5  4.3  5.3  6.3  7.4  8.5 Real  GDP  (growth  rate)  .0.0  0.6  0.6  0.'  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.1
Domestic  demand  (.).  0.0  0.4  0.4  0.9  1.3  3.5  2.0  2.4  2.9  3.3  3.9 Consumption  expenditure  (%)  .0.0  0.2  0.6  1.1  1.9  2.8  3.8  4.9  ti.1  7.5  9.0 Gross  investment  (.).  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.3  -0.3  -1.6  -2.8  -4.2  -5.-9  -7.9  -9.8 Exports  of goods  |  services  (..)  0.0  2.2  3.8  5.6  7.6  9 6  11  .6  13.7  16.0  18.3  20.7 Imports  of goods  services  (%.)  0.0  1.4  1.0  2.3  2.8  2.5  2  7  2.8  2.8  2.6  2.6
Real  GDP  (80Sb)  . 0  ..  . 0.0  18.1  37.1  62.7  94.2  132.6  170.8  213.4  261  0  313.8  372.3 Consumption  expenditure  (80Sb)  .0.  0.0  4.4  13.5  27.8  47.5  73.3  103  1  138.0  178.5  224.9  277.8 Gross  investment  (8OSb)  ...........  0.0  6.7  0.1  2.5  -2.7  -10.6  -28.9  -44.5  -f4.2  -88.6  -113.6 Real  net  exports  (80Sb)  .- 0.0  7.9  24.4  33.0  49.3  74.6  94.1  116.2  141.3  170.1  198.5
Prices  I  Supply
Atisu'ptbun  dIetldtOr  (%)  .0.0  -1.6  -2.2  -3.0  -3.9  -4.9  -5.9  -6.8  -7.7  -8.6  -9.4 Als..rptlon  deflator  (inflation  rate)  0.0  -1.7  -0.6  -0.8  -1.0  I  I  -1  -ti  0  -1.0  -I.0  0.9 GhP  deflator  (M  ....................  0.0  -2.1  -3.2  -4.5  -6.0  -7.6  e  0  -10.4  -31.7  -13.0  -14.2 EAport  price  deflator  (.).  0.0  -3.4  -5.7  -8.0  -10.2  -I2.5  -14.b  -16 6  -18.5  -20.5  -22.4 Import  price  deflator  (.).  0.0  -1.3  -1.4  -1.7  -2.0  -2.4  -2.8  -3.1  -3.5  -3.8  -4.0
International  Accounts
Trade  balance  (Sb)  .- 0.0  -10.9  -14.8  -32.7  -45.1  -50.2  -5S  0  -64.6  -69.8  -73.2  -81.6 Current  account  balance  (Sb)  .- 0.0  -10.9  -33.3  -29.1  -39.6  -43.4  -50  2  -5bu.U  -60 6  -63.8  -72.2 Net  debt  (Sb)  .0.0  -4.1  -8.2  -12.3  -16.5  -20.7  -24.9  -29.1  -32.2  -34.8  -37.0 Interest  payments  as  a 7  of exports.  -0.0  0.1  -0.0  -0.3  -0.4  -0.5  -0.6  U.b  -U.b  -U.b  -0.6
As  a percent  of nominal  GOP
Trade  balance .- 0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.7  -0.8  -0.9  -0.9  -'.0  -1.0  -1.0  -1.0 Current  account  balance .- 0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.6  -0.8  -0.8  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9  -1.0 Net  debt  .........  . -0.0  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.8  U.9  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.4
Nominal  effective  exchange  rate  (7).  0.0  1.0  1.1  1.2  1.4  I.6  1.8  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.0 Reel  effective  exchange  rate  (%).  0.0  -0.4  -3.1  -1.9  -2.9  -3.8  -4.1  -5 6  -6.4  -7.2  -8.0
Net  Creditor  Countries
Real  GDP  (.).  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2 Real  GDP  (growth  rate)  .0.0  0.4  -0.2  0.2  0.0  -0.2  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  -0.0  0.0
Domestic  demand  (%)  .0.0  -0.4  -0.9  -1.4  -2.1  -2.7  -3.3  -3 5  -3.7  -3.8  -3.7 E.ports  of goods  |  services  (..)  0.0  0.8  0.7  1.3  3.5  1.3  1.b  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.6 InpOrts  of 9gOOs  i  services  (..)  0.0  -0.7  -1.6  -2.7  -3.  4.7  -5.5  -6.0  -6.3  6.4  -6.3
Export price  deflator  (.).  -0.0  -1.5  -1.9  -2.5  -3.1  3.7  -4.4  4.9  5.4  -5.8  -6.2 Import  price  deflator  .. ).  0.0  -1.9  -2.7  -3.7  -4.8  -6.1  -7.4  -- 8.8  -30.2  -11.8  -13.4
Trade  balance  (Sb).  -0.0  3.1  5.3  9.6  13.8  17.7  22.2  26.8  31.4  36.2  41.6 Current  account  jalance  (Sb)  -0.0  3.1  4.9  8.6  12.5  16.6  21.6  27.0  32.6  38.3  44.8 Net  foreign  assets  (Sb)  .- 0.0  3.3  7.9  16.4  28.6  45.0  66.3  92.9  125.2  363.1  207.5
World  Prices
Price  of  oil  .- 0.0  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2  -1.4  -t.6  -1.8  -2.0  -2.2  -2.4  -2.5 Price  index  of  comnodities  .0.0  -12.4  -23.3  -32.7  -41.0  -48.4  -53.8  -58.6  -62.9  -66.9  -70.4OSET  MULTIZ_OCHIGH-S
'Deviations  of  M4ULTIZ_DCH-IGH-S  from  MULTJZ_CONTROL
1990  1993  1992  -993  1994  3995  1996  3997  3998  1999  2000
All Industrtal Countries
National  Income
Real  GOP  (.).............  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4
Real  GDP  (growth  rate)  ........  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  -0.0  -0.0  -0.1  -0  I  -0.0  -0.0
Real  GNP  (.).............  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3
Domestic  demand  (.)........  0.0  0.8  1.2  1.6  1.8  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.8  1.9 Consumption  -0xpenditure  (%).....  0.0  0.5  1.3  1.6  1.9  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.2  2.2  2.2
Gross  private  investment  (%).)  ..  0.0  2.2  2.7  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.6  2.5  2.4  2.4  2.5
Exports  of  goods  and  services  ().)  0.0  -0.4  0.3  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.0  -0.2  -0.4  -0.5 Imports  of  goods  and  services  (.)  0.0  1.8  3.5  4.5  5.1  5.4  5.4  5.2  5  3  5.0  5.0
Real  GNP  (8OSb)...........  0.0  26.1  42.5  59.3  70.4  70.8  67.9  53.8  49.7  43.8  41.5
Real  GOP  (80Sb)...........  0.0  25.7  43.4  61.7  74.1  75.7  74.3  66.5  59.2  55.3  55.3
Consumption  expenditure  WUS)  ..  0.0  33.2  69  8  105.7  135.7  156.3  161.5  172.0  173.9  176.0  180.4
Gross  private  investmnent  (80$b)..  0.0  49.0  .2.5  70.7  73.7  74.0  70.7  61.8  67.5  69.6  73.0
Real  niet  enpurtt.  (0Sb)  .......  0.0  -56.5  -89.0  -- 114.8  -135  3  -%154.6  -164.1  -173.3  -182.1  -190.3  -198.1
Real  qouvt  expenditure  (80$6)...  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Go.oernment
(,oen. govvt  financial  balance  (Sb)..  -0.0  24.5  41.4  54.2  tb8.5  47.4  30  /  11.8  -5.1  -16.9  -22.7 Gen.  govV't financial  balance/GNP  (7.)  -0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0  3  0.2  0  1  0)  0  0.0  -0.1  -0.1
Government  debt  (Sb)  .........  -0.0  -72.7  -114.4  -175.2  -244  3  -304.0  -344  3  35?7 8  346.9  -318.0  -278.8
Government  debt/GNP..........  -0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.6  -0.8  -1.0  -IA1  I.  -3.0  -0.8  -0.6
Money  I  Interest  Rates
money  supply  (.)...........  0.0  -1.5  -1.6  -1.4  -3.0  -0.7  -0.5  -0  4  -0  4  -0.4  -0.5
Money  supply  (growth  rate)  ......  0.0  -3.7  -0.1  0.2  0.4  0.3  0  3  0  1  -0 0  -0.1  -0.1
Money  target  (.)  ...........  -0.0  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2  -1i.3  -1.4  -15  5  -1.4  .1.3  -1.2
Short-term  interest  rate  .......  0.0  -0.3  -0.7  -1.1  -1.2  -1.2  -I 0  0.8  -0.7  0.6  .0.6
Long-term  interest  rate........  -0.0  -0.9  -3.0  -1.1  -1.0  -0.9i  -0./  0.b  -0.f6  -0.6  -0.b
Prices  I  Supply
Absorption  deflator  ()........  0.0  -1.8  -2.2  -2.5  -2.7  -2.9  -2.9  -2 9  -2.9  -2 9  -3.0 Absorption  uefletor  (inflation  rate)  0.0  -. 1.6  -0.5  -0.4  -0.2  -0.3  -0.0  0  0  C0  0  0.0  0.0 GNP  deflator  (5...........  0.0  -1.3  -1.5  -1.7  -3.8  -3.8  -1.8  -1.8  -l  Ii  1 8  -1.9 EAport  price  deflator  (.)......  0.0  -2.0  -Z.4  -2.6  .2.7  -2.7  -2.7  .2.E.  2  6  ~.'.  2.6
Import  price  deflator  (.)  .......  0.0  -3.5  -4.8  -5.6  -6.1  -6  4  -6.4  6.4  6  A  6.4  -b.4
Capacity  utilization  rate.......  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.2  0.2  0  I  0 0  0.0  .0.1
Long-term  real  interest  rate  .....  0.0  -0.7  -0.9  -1.0  -0.9  -0.8  -0.6  -A  -0.')_C..  0.5  -0.6
International  Accounts
Trade  balance  (Sb)  ..........  -0.0  -20.6  -25.4  -30.0  -34.0  -403.4  -47.3  -b6.7  -6(7  -78l.0  -89 1
Current  account  balance  (Sb)  .....  0.0  -20.6  -27.7  -35.1  -42.0  -51.1  -63.3  -74.3  -89.1  -105.2  -122.3
Net  foreign  assets (Sb)........  0.0  -20.6  -48.3  -83.4  -125.5  -176.6  -237.9  -312.2  -401.3  -b06.6  -828.9
As a percent of nominal GNP
Trade  balance............  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  *0  2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3 Current  account  balance.......  0.0  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  -0 3  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4
Net foreign assets.........  0.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.5  -O  8  -0.8  -1.0  -1.3  -1.5  -1.8  -2  1OSET  MULTIZ_OCHilGtiS
Deviation& of MULTlZ_OCH-IGH-S  from  MULTIZ_CONTROL
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Net  Debtor  Countries
National  Income
Real  GDP  (%).............  0.0  1.6  3.4  5.3  7.3  9.2  10.5  11.2  II  6  12 0  12.4 Real  GDP  (growth  rate).......  0.0  1.6  1.9  2.0  2.0  1.9  1.A  0.7  0.3  0.4  0.4
Domestic  demtand  %.........  0.0  0.4  1.6  3.2  4.9  6.5  7.6  8.2  8 5  8 8  9.2 Consumption  expenditure  (%)....  0.0  0.3  1.2  2.6  4  4  6.5  7.9  8.1  8  7  8.9  9.2 Gross  investment  (1........  0.0  0.8  3.0  4.9  6.0  6.4  6.6  7.i  8.0  8.7  9.2 Exports  of goods  services  ().  ..  0.0  4.4  8.4  11.7  14.2  15.8  16.8  1/.3  17.8  i8.0  18  0 Import:  of goodsI  service&  (%)...  0.0  -0.2  1.9  4.1  6.0  7.0  7.5  7.6  7.6  7  4  7  2
Reel  GOP  (80Sb)...........  0.0  49.1  110.9  185.5  267.1  3S4.6  411  6,  453.2  480  5  5!0.3  542.8 Consumption  expendliture  (805b) ..  0.0  6.7  27.2  62.7  1II.7  171.4  ?1b.b  243  9  252  2  265.6  283.4 Gross  investment  (60Sb).......  0.0  6.0  24.9  43.6  57.8  65).0  69.1  75.5  88 0  91.7  105 8 Real  net  eAports  (80*)0).-.....  0.0  34.3  56.1  /2.8  86.2  IOU;.1  05.0~  111.4  116.9  121.B  1251.9J
PricesI  S.pp4ly
AL,$  uri,t  ioIl deflator  1%)........  0.0  -8.3  -11.8  -13.6  .14  4  -14  8  I')0  It. I  -l  2  -15  4  -15.5 AL!usuption  detlator  (inflation  rate)  0.0  -8.  6  -- 4.0  -. 2.0  -1.1.  1).5  u  .1  Ul 1  0.1  -0.1  ~0.1 6N6%P  uet lat.)r  (%)  ...........  0.0  -S.3  -13.3  - 15  4  -16, 5)  /  I  -It  .1  II 51  -11  1  -- 11.8  %1.9 t.purt  pr  Ice dlefla4tor  (.......  0.0  -6.9  -I.1  -11.4  - 4.  J  J3.  .1:  I  I  2  13 3  13.4  13.5 limport  price  deflator  (.......  0.0  -2.6  -3.5  -4.1  -4.4  .4  4  4.4  .4  J1  4.3  -4.2
International  Accounts
lrade  balance  (Sb)  ..........  -0.0  -1.1  -4.8  -8.9  -12.8  -14.0  -14  8  II  I  _10.9  -9.1  -8.0 Current  acCOuint balance  (Sb).....  -0.0  -1.1  -2.0  -2.5  -3.1  -3.7  !5  2  5,  LI  6  -~.  6  -5.7 Net  debt  (Sb).............  0.0  0.8  2.5  4.7  7.4  10.3  1?  7  1.4  8'  It'.3  17.1  17.2 Interest  payments  as a  %  of exports.  -0.0  0.4  -0.2  -0.9  -1.4  -1.0  -1.4  I  1.0  0.8  ~0.7
As  a percent  of nominal  GOP
Tradle  balance............  -0.0  0.0  -0.0  -0O.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  0).1  -0.1  -0.0  -0.0 Current  account  balance.......  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.1  U.1  0.1  -0.1 Net  debt  ..............  -0.0  2.7  3.5  3.6  3.2  2.8  2.1  2.5  2.1i  2.4  2.4
Nominal  effective  exchange  rate  (5).  0.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.3  1 3  1 3  1.3  1.2  1.1 Real  effective  eAchange  rate  (5)  ....  0.0  -8.3  -12.7  -14.9  -16.0  -16.5  -16.1  -lb  8  -16.9  -16.9  -17.0
Not  Creditor  Countries
Real  GOP  (5)  ..............  0.0  -1.5  -1.5  -1.3  -1.0  -0.9  -0.9  -1.0  .1.1  -1.3  -1.4 Real  GOP  (growth  rate)  .........  0.0  -1.5  -0.0  0.2  0.3  0,1  0.0  -U.1  -0.1  .0.2  -0.2
Domestic  demand  (..........  0.0  -8.3  -10.7  -12.5  -13.7  -14.1  -15.2  -lb.5>  -15.9  1i6.3  -16.7 Exports  of goods  services  (  .. )  0.0  0.2  1.1  2.0  2.7  3.0  3.2  3.3  3.2  3.2  3.1 Imports  of goods  services  (  .. )  0.0  -14.7  -19.9  -23.0  -24.7  -25.9  -26.5  -21 0  -~27.4  -27.9z  -28.4
Export  price  deflator  (........  -0.0  -4.9  -7.9  -9.2  -9.8  -9.9  .- 9.9  -9.8  -9.6  -9.0  -9.4 Import  price  deflator  (........  0.0  -3.1  -4.3  -5.0  -5.4  -5.6  -5.7  -5.7  -5.7  -5.7  -5.7
Trade  balaoce  (Sb)  .... 0.0  20.0  28.3  36.3  43.6  49.9  55.6  b1.0  66.6  72.6  79.3 Current  account  balance  (Sb)  . -0.0  20.0  28.2  36.2  43.7  52.2  61.6  /1.8  83.0  95.0  107.6 Net  foreign  assets  (Sb)  ........  0.0  20.0  48.1  04.0  127 3  179.0  240.0  311.4  394  I  488  6  596.2
World  Prices
Price  of  oil  ..............  0.0  -1.3  -1.6  -I.?  -1.8  -1.9  1.9  1.9  -'.9  -1.9  -1.9 Price  $ndex  of coimmodities  .......  0.0  -1.4  -2.1  -2.9  -3.8  -4.9  -5.94  6.8  -7.7  -8.3  -8I.9OSET  MULTIZ_OCLOWS
Oeviations  of MULIIZ_DCLOWS  from  MULTIZ_CONTROL
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
All  Industrial  Countries
Notional  Incoe
Real  GOP (%)  ........................  0.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.5  -0.6  -0.6  -0.6  -0.6  -0.5  -0.5  -0.5
Real  GOP  (growth  rate)  ..............  0.0  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0
Real GNP  (%)  ........................  0.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.5  -0.5  -0.5  -0.4  -0.4  -0.3  -0.2
Domestic  domand  W  . ..............  0.0  -0.8  -1.2  -1.6  -1.8  -2.0  -2.0  -2.0  -2.0  -2.0  -2.1
Consumptlon,axpanditure  (  .......  0.0  -0.5  -1.0  -1.5  -1.9  -2.2  -2.3  -2.4  -2.4  -2.4  -2.4
Gross  private  Investment (%)  ......  0.0  -2.2  -2.8  -3.1  -3.1  -3.1  -3.0  -2.8  -2.8  -2.8  -2.9
Exports  of  goods and  services  (S.  0.0  0.8  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.6  1.0  1 3  1.6  1.8
Imports  of goods  and  services  (%).  0.0  -1.6  -3.2  -4.0  -4.5  -4.7  -4.7  -4.5  .. 4.4  -4.3  -4.3
Real  GNP  (80Sb)  ...................  0.0  -19.5  -32.9  -49.1  -61.0  -63.2  -62.4  -54.3  -44.9  -37.4  -33.1
Real  GOP  (80St))  ...................  0.0  -19.0  -34.2  -53.1  -68.6  -74.5  -78.0  -14.1  -69  1  -66.2  -66.7
Consumption  expenditure  (8OSb) ....  0.0  -31.4  -66.3  -102.1  -133.6  -156.8  -171.7  -119.6  -184 4  -189 3  -196.8
Gross  private  investment  (80Sb)...  0.0  -49.4  -64.9  -75.3  -79.7  81.6  -79.7  77.8  -78.2  -81.1  -85.5
Real  .it  e.ports  (8OSb)  ...........  0.0  61.8  97.0  124.3  144 7  163.9  173.3  183.3  193 5  204.2  215.5
kedl  iuvvt  expenditure  (80Sb) .....  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  IJ  0  0  0  0.0  0.0  o  .0  0.0  0.0
0u.or  imen  t
Gon.  govVt  financial  balance  (Sb)  ...  -0.0  -23.1  -41.0  -55.4  -61.3  -50.5  -J3  ?  -12.6  6.8  20 9  28 2
Gen.  govVt  financial  balance/GNP  IS)  -0.0  -0  I  -0.2  -0.3  -0  3  -0.7  -o.i  -0.n  0  0  0  I  0.1
Government  debt  (Sb)  ................  -0.0  66.8  106.7  168.1  236.4  299.h  343  4  3t8.5  346.8  315.5  272.9
Government  debt/GNP  .- 0.0  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.7  0.9  1.0  0.9  0  8  0.6  0.4
Money  I  Interest  Rates
Money  supply  .....................  0.0  1.6  1.7  1.6  1.2  0.9  0.6  (.4  0.4  0.5  0.5
money  supply  (growth  rate)  ..........  0.0  1.8  0.1  -0.2  -0.4  -0.3  -0.3  -O 2  -0.0  0.1  0.1
Money  target  (%)  ....................  -0.0  1.1  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.3  1.4  1  4  1  4  1.3  1.1
Short-term  interest  rate  ............  0.0  0.4  0.8  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.2  1  0  0 9  0  8  0.8
Long-tirm  interest  rate  .............  -0.0  1.0  1.2  1.2  1.2  I  I  0 9  0 8  0 8  0  8  0.8
Prices  I  Supply
Absorption  deflator  (%)  .............  0.0  1.7  2.4  2.9  3.1  3.3  3.4  3.4  3.5  3.5  3.6
Absorptloe.  deflator  (Inflation  rate)  0.0  1.7  0.6  O.5  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
GNP  deflator  (S)  ......  0.0  1.3  1.7  2.1  2.2  2  3  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.5  2.5
Export  price  deflator  (S).0.0  2.1  2.6  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.2  3  2  3.2  3.2  3.2
Import  price  deflator  (%)  ...........  0.0  3.6  5.1  6.0  6.4  6.8  6.8  6.8  6  8  6.8  6.9
Capacity  utilization  rate  ...........  0.0  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3  -0.2  -0.1  -0.0  0.0  0.1
Long-term  real  interest  rate  ........  0.0  0.7  1.0  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.8
International  Accounts
Trade  balance  (Sb)  ......  -0.0  30.1  45.3  61.G  75.7  91.8  105.8  122.3  140.4  160.4  182.2
Current  account  balance  (Sb).0.0  30.1  48.7  70.3  92.0  116.7  140.9  t68.0  197.7  230.4  266.9
Het  foreign  assets (Sb)  .............  0.0  30.1  78.8  149.1  24t.1  357.8  498.7  666.7  864.5  1094.9  1361.8
As a percent  of nominal  GNP
Trade  balance ......  -0.0  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6
Current  account balance.0.0  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.8
Net  foreign  assets  ................  0.0  0.2  0.5  0.8  1.2  1.6  2.1  2.6  3.1  3.6  4.2OSET  MULTIZ_OCLOWS
Deviations  of MULTIZ_OCLOWS  from  MULTIZ_CONTROL
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Net  Debtor  Countries
National  Income
Real  GDP  S  ........................  0.0  -1.5  -2.9  -4.3  -5.6  -6.8  -7.4  -7.8  -8.0  -8.3  -8.5 Reel  GDP  (growth  rate)  ..............  0.0  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  -1.4  -1.3  -0.7  -0.4  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3
Domestic  demand (  ...............  O.G  -0.4  -1.4  -2.6  -3.7  -4.7  -5.3  -5.7  -5.8  -6.0  -6.2 Consumption  expenditure  M .......  0.0  -0.5  -1.3  -2.5  -3.9  -5.4  -6.2  -6.3  -5.9  -5.8  -5.8 Gross  invstbment (S)  ..............  0.0  -0.0  -2.5  -2.7  -3.2  -3.1  -3.2  -4.0  -5.5  -6.5  -7.2 Exports  of goods  | services  (%)...  0.0  -4.1  -7.4  -10.1  -11.9  -13.2  -13.8  -14.1  -14.2  -14.3  -14.2 Imports of goods  I  services  (S)  ...  0.0  0.4  -1.7  -3.9  -5.7  -6.7  -7.3  -7.3  -7.2  -6.9  -6.6
Reol  GOP  (80$b)  ...................  0.0  -46.2  -2  .3  -150.8  -205.4  -260.8  -292.6  -316.1  -333.1  -352.0  -373.0 Consumption  expenditure  (80Sb) ....  0.0  -10.6  -,'.1  -61.6  -99.4  -142.0  -167.9  -177.5  -172.0  -172.9  -179.1 Gross  investment  (80b)  ...........  0.0  -0.3  -12.9  -24.1  -30.4  -31.0  -33.4  -42.6  -60.4  -73.1  -82.7 Real  not  e.ports  (8OSb)  ...........  -0.0  -32.0  -49.7  -60.1  -67.5  -75.9  -77.7  -80.9  -84.2  -87.5  -90.6
Prices  I  Suppl
y
Atjsurutln  outaltor  I.).0.0  9.1  13.7  16.2  17.4  18.0  18.2  18.3  18.4  18.6  18.7 Ausuiptiun  aftletor  (linflatin  rate)  0.0  9.4  4.4  2.3  1.0  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 ubhl  jutlotor  (1)  ....................  0.0  10.3  15.5  18.5  19.9  20.7  21.1  21.2  21.4  21.6  21.8 t.purt  price  deflator 1  ...........  0.0  7.4  10.5  12.3  13.2  13.9  14.0  14.0  14.1  14.2  14.4 Import  price  deflator  M ...........  0.0  2.5  3.5  4.1  4.4  4.6  4.5  4.4  4.4  4.3  4.3
International  Accounts
Trade  balance  (Sb)  ..................  -0.0  1.4  5.4  9.6  13.5  14.5  15.3  13.7  11.7  9.9  8.7 Current  account  balance  (Sb)  ........  -0.0  1.4  2.4  2.7  2.9  3.0  4.3  4.5  4.7  4.7  4.8 Not  debt  (Sb)  .......................  0.0  -1.0  -3.2  -5.7  -8.3  -10.6  -12.5  14  0  -14.9  -15.2  -14.5
Interest  payments  as  a  It  of exports.  -0.0  -0.4  0.2  1.0  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.5  1.3  1.1  1.0
As  a  percent  of  nominal  GDP
Troae  bolance .....................  -0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.0 Currant  account  balance ...........  -0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0 Not  debt  ..........................  -0.0  -2.6  -3.3  -3.4  -3.2  -3.0  -2.9  -2.9  -2.8  -2.8  -2.8
Nominal  effective  exchange  rate  (S).  0.0  -0.9  -1.0  -1.0  -1.0  -1.1  -1.1  -1.1  -1.1  -1.0  -0.9 Real  effective  exchange  rate  (S)  ....  0.0  8.3  12.7  14.9  15.9  16.3  16.4  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5
Not  Creditor  Countries
R-al  GDP  (  ..........................  0.0  2.0  2.6  2.8  2.9  3.0  3.1  3.4  3.6  4.0  4.3 Real  GOP  (growth  ,ate)  ................  0.0  2.1  0.6  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3
Domestic  demand  ( .....  0.0  11.0  16.0  20.3  23.3  25.9  27.0  28.0  29.0  30.0  31.2 Exports  of goods  |  services  (S.)  0.0  -0.0  -0.9  -1.9  -2.6  -2.9  -3.2  -3.2  -3.1  -3.0  -3.0 Imports  of goods  | services  ( .....  0.0  19.6  29.7  37.2  41.9  45.5  47.1  48.6  50.0  51.5  53.2
Export  price  deflator  (S)  .............  -0.0  5.4  9.3  11.3  12.2  12.6  12.6  12.5  12.3  12.2  12.0 Import  price  deflator  M .............  0.0  3.1  4.3  5.1  5.5  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.8
Trade balance  (Sb)  ....................  -0.0  -29.5  -48.3  -67.8  -85.2  -101.2  -113.7  -126.1  -139.3  -154.2  -171.0 Current  account balance  (Sb)  ....  ......  -0.0  -29.5  -49.0  -70.8  -92.6  -116.4  -139.2  -163.2  -188.8  -216.8  -247.8
Net  foreign  assets  (Sb)  ...............  -0.0  -29.5  -78.4  -148.8  -240.9  -356.8  -495.4  -658.0  -846.4  -1062.8  -1310.2
World  Prices
Price  of  oil.  -0.0  1.3  1.7  2.1  2.2  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.5  2.5  2.6 Price  Index of coinodities.0.0  1.8  2.8  3.7  4.5  5.5  6.4  7.3  8.1  8.9  9.6L.oicv  ;-lsesarch WorktnrQ  Pzk±n  I`
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